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FOREWORD
W m . T IS MONOPOLY? How does it affect the rank
and file of. the American people? In what forms does
it appear?
Through the work of the Temporary'National Econonic c o b i t t e e , our gbvernment has provided from .
public funds a wealth of factual material on these and
kindred questions. And1 facts assembled in the volumi- .
nous hearings and reports of the TNEC should have the
widest possible circulation, for they provide chaptQ and
verse on the tremendous concentration of economic .
power which threatens, from within, the vitality of our
- political democracy.
. Some of the more important:findings of ;he TNEC on
.
monopoly and the concentration of economic power are
briefly told in ,th&pamphlet. And the facts ,make it
- ,inescapably clear that a tremendous responsibility rests
upon the American people-wage-workers, farinem; small
business' 'men, housewives, technically trained profes-'
' sionals-all the tens of millions who have been compelled
t~ contribute to the Super-profits of big business. That '
the.ec~nomi'cpower of these big busi~essmen who are
monopolists and finance capitalists mus,t be held in check,
none would den);. Just how this can be done is the
question.
Could we restore free competition of private enter-. .
prise? And if we could, what would happenato the tre- rnekdous technical gains in production methods and ipdustrial integration which have been entangled with the.
. evils of monopolv? Must we cut down the fruitful tree
5
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of large-scale production in order to destroy he poisonous vine of monopoly?
In the present war the democratic forces of organized
labor are showing a new political maturity. As they play
their more active role in determining policies of production and restraining dictatorial and fascist trends -within
our own country, they may also point the way to a solution of this problem. Such a solution is urgently needed.
For the political democracy, which we are defending
in this war, will not long survive unless we can also build
a new foundation of 'democracy in our economic life.
Traditionally our democra'tic state was based upon the
economic democracy of farmers and artisans whol.owned
their land and tools. . Will the ,4merican people create
new forms of economic democracy, adapted to the fullest
peacetime utilization of our large-scale industry?
Confidence ih such a future achievement would more
actively unite us in our determination to destroy the fascism of the Axis countries and defend our political democracy within the United States. '
I

'

This pamphlet for the most part is made up of excerpts
from the extensive hearings, monographs and reports of
the TNEC. It puts the findings of the committee chiefly
in its own words or in brief summaries that include the
maid points of the final rep&t. All of the facts are related to the major subject of'the
investigation: the concentration of wealth, ownership and
corporate control in the United states. Many phases of
the investigation relating to labor conditions, technological progress, unemployment; insurance companies, housing, taxation, fiscal policy and the like are not dealt with
'in this pamphlet. The reports and monographs on these
subiects
are all recommended As rich sources of ins
8
foqmation.
,
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THE INDICTMENT O F MONOPOLY
I N A MESSAGE to Congress April 29, 1938, relating to
the concentration of economic power and' its effects on
the capitalist systern, President ~oosevel
t declared:
"The first truth is that the liberty of a democracy is
not safe if the people tolerate the- growth of private
power to a. point where it becomes stronger than their
democratic state itself. That, in its essence, is fascism. .
" ~ m o nus~ today a concentration of private 'power
without equal in history is growing.
, ':This concentration is 'seriously impairing the economic effectiveness of private enterprise as a way of providi~?gemployment for labor and capital and as a way of
assuring a more equitable distribution of income and
earnings among the-people of the Nation as a whole.
"Private enterprise is ceasing to be free enterprise and
is becoming a cluster af private collectivisms; masking
itself as a system of free enterprise after the ~merican
model, it is ih fact becoming a concealed cartel system
after the European Godel."

'

..

I

I n -this manner the President called attention to the
seriousness of the problems to be studied by the newly
appointed Temporary National Economic Committee.*

'

* TNEC was created by-a joint resolution of Congress (public Res.
No. I 13, 75th Gong.), approved June 16, 1938. (Ther work-of the
committee was completed in March, 1941.) The committee consisted of members of the Senate, Rouse of Representatives, and
various Federal departments and agencies. It was ihstructed by
the re501ution "td make a full and complete study and investigation ,
with respect to the matters referred to in the - President's message
of April 29, 1938, on monopoly and the copcentration of economic.
power in and financial control over production and distribution of
goods and services.
Public hearings began ' December I, 1938, and were held intermitten tly thereafter for 18 months; 552 wi tnesies appeared and

. . ."
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This committee% investigation - of the concentrtrtion of
economic power in the united States is the first such
I
large-scale government investigation since the Congressional Pujo Committee in igie exposed the money trust.
~ h o u ~
theh TNEC study covers many phases of the
nation's economic life, throughout there runs one fundamental theme-the dominant power and position in
American life of corporate big busi~ess,of monopoly, of
concentrated private economic 'power.
/
~rescntingwhat it calls the "counts iil the indictment
of monopoly," TNEC Monograph No. 2 1, cornpet it ion
and Monopoly in American Industry, surnm&.zes the
destructive effects of tnonopoly on American+ economic
life:
It "inflicts no penalty on inefficiency." Regardless of
what the monopolist does, "his hold upon the market
is
,
. assured."
"The ~rionopolistmay engage in researdi and .invent
. new materials, methods and machines, but he will be
reluctant to make use of these inventions if. they would
'compel him to strap existing equipment or if he believes
their ultimate profitability is in doubt . . his refusal to
cut prices. deprives the community of a* gain."
Monopoly "causes an u'neconomic allocation of productive resources" and "prevents the full utilization of
'productive capacity; . . A large -part of the productive
plant is condemned to idleness."
YBy refusing to sell at figures that would' move his
goods the monopolist leaves factories idle and labor unemployed. . . By stabilizing price, the monopolist unstabilizes the whole economy."
'

-

\

A

A

.

,

@

.

.

testified. More .than no,ooo printed pag'ks' of testimony and 3,300
techni'cal exhibits appear in the records, whi.& run into 8n -large
voliimes-37 of hearings and 43 of special monographs, as well as
the two final reports. All facts, figurm. and quotations in this
pamphlet, unless otherwise spedified, are from these volumes.

8
\

Monopoly "impedes the raising of the general plane of
living
.it makes the total -output of goods and services
,
smaller than it otherwise would be." ,
It "contributes to inequality in the distribution of in- come. . . A more nearly perfect mechanism for making
the poor poorer and the rich richer could scarcely be
deuised." [Our' emphasis.-Ed .I
.

%
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MONOPOLY OBSTRUCTS WAR EFFORT

By far the: most serious of ' the TNEC 'criticisms of
rnti~opolyrelate to its harpful effects on the nation's war
production potential:
"Nonopolyimpairs democracy's ability to defend itself
in time of war. National defense requires an expansion
of output: monopoly seeks to augment its profit by restricting output and maintaining price. -It thus obstructs
- the procurement .of arms 'and supplies, increases the cost
of defense, adds to the burden of debt and taxation, ah&
undermines national porale. When . the Nation is
attacked, it may even turp the balance from victotyr tof
defeat." [Our emphasis.--El
In.di&ussing the attitude of "business" (which means
big business) in time of war, sthe TNEC says: ,
''Speaking bluntly, the Government and.the public are
'over barrel'. when h comes to dealing with business' in
.time of war or other crisis. Business refuses to work, except on - terms which it dictates. It controls the natural
*resources,the liquid assets, the strategic position in the
country's economic st1ucture, aild-.its technical. equipment and knowledge of processes! The experiknce of the
World War, now apparently being repeated, indicates
that business will ~ i s ethis control only if it is 'pqid
. properly.' In effect, this is blackmail, not too fully disguised." 3
I

a

-
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At the final hearings, 04 February 12, 1941, Assistant
Attorney General Thurman Arnold made charges against
certain sections of American big business amounting almost to accusations of treason.
Referring to the investigation dy the Anti-Trust
Division of the Department of Justice of industries involved in war production, he dehared:
I

+

T h e united States ~overnrnenthas been charged
excessive and unreasonable prices for essegtial war materials as a*result of agreement between domestic and
foreign companies, and collusive bidding on Army and
. Navy contracts.
"9. Foreign companies [mainly German companie~Ed.1 have taken out
Datents and entered into cartel
'
zrringements in the Un~tedStates on essential war materials - for the purpose and with the effect of blocking
American dev610pment and &a ting serious shortages.
"3. There have been divisions of world markets by
patent agreements between domestic and foreign companies which give .foreign interests the right to determine
where and how the American companies may sell certain
military supplies.
. "4. It 'seems probable that vital- military information
has been disclosed to foreign companies though the requirement of itemized descriptiye royalty
payments in
,
patent license agreements." 4
"I.

-

Arnold further disclosed that civil or crimink actions
had been started by the Anti-Trust Division in the itIuminum, military optical goods, tungsten carbide, airplane
fabric, bentonite ar6d magnesium industries, while grand
juries were investigating drug, aviation precision equipment and surgical instrument and equipment1firms. At
least 31 . other industries producing vital war materials
were then awaiting investigation because of the Division's lack of facilities to deal with them.
'

'

.-

.
'

His Division, Arnold said, was. constantly uncovering
startling instances o f ' ~ e r m a ncontrol in vital American
war,industries. Among the American monopofi&named
in this connection were Aluminum Company of America,
Dow chemical Co., Bausch & Lomb Optical Co. and
Beryllium Corpol.ation. In the spring of 1942,some time
after the dose of the TNEC hearings, A r n ~ l dtold - a
Senate committee that Standard Oil Company of New
Jersey had, as a result of international cartel connection
with-the Nazi trust I. G. Farbenindustrie, blocked the
development of synthetic rubber in the United States.
Standard had refused to reveal its processes to the U. S.
Navy and the British government while making them
available to Germany and Italy through I. G. Farbenindustrie.5
f

SUPER-PROFITS
8

"Appreciable monopoly power is said to exist whenever a single seller or a number of sellers acting in unison
control endugh of the supply of a broadly defined commodity to enablc them to augment their profit by limiting output and raising prices." s
'

Monopoly power appears in various forms. Basically
it is the power to control important resources, to dominate markets, and to fix prices. Its purpose is to secure
an extraordinary or super-profit in, addition to the average, or ordinary, business profit;
Super-profits are the badge of monopoly, and the domain of super-prdfits is big business. The'bulk of corporate wealth and income is located in a comparatively
small number of big corporations. Summaries of corporate income tax Yeturns for 1937 show that the 894
largest corporations in this country-less than 1/10 of
1%
of the total number reporting-owned about 45%
of the total 'corporate assets.
\

a

11

.;cf
:

9 -

\

The distribution of net income [i.e, ' profits] alse is
highly concentrated. In the first place, 285,810 corpora. tions reported no net income .in 1937, while ign,o28
corporations reported net incomes. Of these lauer cor- .
poration~ only 248-i/ 10 of 1%-had net incomes of
$5,000,000 and over, but this group received 40% of the
total net income' of all incom&reporting corporations.7
A study of monopoly profits in 1937 showed that out of
a group of 591 large corporations cbvered, more than a
third, accounting for approximately half of the income'
of the group, "reported profits of more than 1501, on investment." The study concluded: - "It is obvious that
the Federal taxes affect 'monopoly' profits only to a very
minor exgent."
The history of the Aluminum Co. of America reveals
the super-profits of monopoly. In the 50 years from the
time of its original incorpor'atiori as the Pittsburgh Reduction Co. in 1888, up to 1939, its net income exceeded
$335,ooo,ooo. In 'the 24
from 1889 through ig i e
it made $33,0~0,oooon an original investment of $z,ooo,ooo. Its average annual return on in~ested'ca~ital
during various perioda was: 35.7% from 1905 to i 908; 17.6%
from igog to 1914; 19.3% from 1915 to 1918; 9.4%-in
i g ~ gand 1920. Following 9 loss of 2.3% in 1921 and,
1924, the return was 10.2% from lgzg to igeg; and 2.6%
from 1930 to 1934. The company averaged nearly 12%
on invested capital from 1935 to 1939. Its net profit in
1939 was $36,600,000 and in 1940 over $44,ooo,ooo, the
largest in its historj..@.
united Shoe ~ a c h i n e r yCorp. provides another example of the s ~ ~ e r - ~ r o of
f i tmono
s
pol^. In its early years
the company made huge profits, paid large dividends in
cash and in stock and built up 'a substantial surplus.
From 1925 to 1930 the average annual return on its.capital stock and surplus stood at 11%; in 1931 and 1932,.
8.5%; and from 1938 through 1937, morecthan 13%. No
12

wonder Fortune titled an article on the corporation "But
Business Is Always Good!" lo

.

METHODS OF GROWTH

.

Apologists of monopoly explain its growth and extension as the "natural" result of the advantages of largescale, mechanized mass production and of the great capital pools required for organizing such large-scale production.
There is no denying the role of technological development, but this development, and the fordation of capital
associated with it, takes place under conditions which are
far from "natural." T ~ U Smonopoly is also a ". . . p.roduct of formal agreements and secret understandings; of
combinations, intercorporate stockholdings, and interlocking directorates; of the ruthless employment of superior financial resources and bargaining power; of unequal representation'before legislatures, courts, and administrative agencies; of the exclusion of competitors
from markets, materials, and sources of investment funds;
of restrictive contracts and, discriminatory prices; of
coercion, intimidation, and violence.
"It is t& product, too, of i,astitutions of .property
which permit private enterprises to take exclusive title
to scarce resources; of franchises, permits, and !licenses
which confer upon -their holders exclusive privileges in
the employment of limited facilities and the perfarman~
of imprtant services; of patents which grant to their
owners the exclusive right to conlrol the use of certain
machines and processes and the manufacture and sale
of certain goods; of tariffs which exclude foreign producers from domestic markets; of statutes 'which exclude
out-of-State producers and ordinances which exclude outof-town producers from local markets; of legislation
which limits output, fixes minimum prices, and handicaps strong competitors; and of inadeq'uate enforcement,
13

over many years, 'of the laws that
. are
.
designed to preserve
.. ..
cbmpetition." l1

1

Summed up, the facts on the concentration of wealth
and ownership in this country show that:
1 : A relatively few corporations own the greater part. ,
, of the coulitry's productive wealth.
2,. A relatively few people own the corporations. Actual
control of the, corpora'tions is exercised by an even
smaller number.
-8;'Thes.controlling intkrests~of different corporations
are .related in such a manner as to form a. handful of
highly integrated power groups.
"We know that most of the wealth and income of the
country is owned by a few large corporations, that these
corporations in t.vn we owned by an infinite~imail~
small number. of people and that. the profits from the
operatio* .of these cw~orationsgo to , a very' small
group. .. ." l2
The "private industrial corporation . . . is. frequently
' a huge collective enterprise affecting the entire national
community, owned by a few, managed.by still fewer and
bdund together with other similar enterprises and finan- cial institutions by a variety of devices in an industrial .
and commercial empire which does not possess the characteristics we call democratic.''
'. The most .irhportani methods by-which the corporate.
,giants -are bound together in interest groups, exercising
control by meak other than majdrity stock ownership,
are interlocking directorates; intercorporate stockholding~,services o f large financial institutions, and an in- dividual's or group of individuals' ~wnershipof ik- . .
portant stcxkholdings in several corporations, various
r

\
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trade and : general busibes -association$, and-sonhetimes
a -tacit acceptance of non-competition." 14
The total iif wealth contxolled by corporations.in this
country, as measured by the assets of 437,777 individual
corporations-submittingbalance sheets to the U, S. Treasury Department, a&ounted to Over $303 billion indI 997:
Of these, the $94 largest corporations, or less thgn 1/10
of 1% of the total,, owned about 45% of the total corporate assets.+
A speciar Securities pnd Exchange Commission (SEC)
stydy prepared for the "TNECshowed the distribution 8f .
owhership in the zoo largest non-financial corporations in
the United States. These 200 giants owned 40% of the .
assets of all non-financial corporations, and accounted for
1
nearly 45*0 of the .dividends distributed by such corpora- tions. Their capital stock was valued at 65% of the total
- ' of all n~n-financial'corporations
listed on t h e - ~ e wYork
'
S.tock and Curb Exchanges 'at the end of 1987.16
The SEC study showed also the great concentration of
corporate ownership. 1t fovnd that in 1937, io,o& persons ,(o.o080J, of the populatioq) owned a fourth, and
. j5,ooo krsoris (0.06% of the population) fully one-half of
all corporate stock held by individuals in this cohntry.17
About half of the estimated eight to nine million stockholders in the country have 'an annual incbme fr6m divi- ..
/dends of less than $lookand the group which depends
economically to a large extent on earnings from stock
investments does not number much more than 500,om. .
Since control of a corporation may be exercised
through many devices other than outright ownership of
, stkick, the SEC report
.
warns at the outset that "The high '
degree of concentratibn of ownership found in this study .
must, therefore, be regarded as the minimum measure .of
contrd over the .zoo largest non-financial American corporations, exercised 'by a small numb& of lar e stockB .
- holdersa7'l?
.
.
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There. were about 8,500,ooo individual shareholdings
recorded in the ooo giant corporations. ~ h e s ewere
.
held by approximately g,ooo,ooo stockholders (shareholders)
, since on the average every stockholder held shares in .
three different stock issues. The highest 1% of recorded
shareholdings accounted for about 60% *of the common
stock of the 200 giant corporations.
Furthermore, .the 20 largest shareholdings in 208 issues
of common stock, about one-twentieth of I % of ail shark
holdings, had a value of nearly 32% of the total value
of these common stocks.
Concentration of stock ownership was most appareilt
in the utility, automobile, -lumber and paper; building
rnatGr&land equipment, and chemical and drug industries. In these the percentages of common stock held in
the oo- largest shareholdings were, respectively, 49.2%.
54.3%140.60/0, 36.2% and 33*8%.19
The SEC report called attention to the very important
fact that a single or closely linked ownership group may
be broken up into a large number of separate shareholdings through a variety of devices, for example, trusts and
holding companies. Thus both ownership and control
are more concentratell than the study of the 2 0 largest
shareholdings reveals since such shareholdings are connected and their influence is wielded in a united manner.
The "largest blocks of stock are in most cases in the
hands of a rather small group having a community of
interest based either on family relationship, on corporate
.
ties, or on long-standing business connections."
An analysis of the 2 0 largest stockholdings, company
by company, made with the intent of locating the dominant control in the respective companies insofar as it was
based on stock ownership, further strengthened this .COGdusion. No account was taken of control by bankers or
officers or directors witbout substantial stocli ownership. .
This walysis reveaIed that in 40% of the 200 giant
16

coriorations, one family or a small number of families*
exercised control through a majority or, more frequently,
a substantial minority of the voting stock. In another
30% of the 2 0 0 cor~orat&5ns,one or more other corpo'htions exercised conk01 but some of these were in turn
controlled by family or other .interest groups21
I n only 30% of the corporations was there reported to
of stockholders.. Although this
. be no domidant
30% included U. S. Steel Corp. and American Telephone
& Telegraph Co., it should be noted that these companies
were dominated in other ways. A study of the National
Resources Committee found them to be p u t of the socalled Morgan-First National coriorate interest group,
the basis of control being mainly interlocking directors
and investment 'banking relationships.
In. its -special study of .three family groups, the du
Ponts, the Mellons and the Rockefellers, the SEC showed
that through stocQoldings alone these three families controlled 15 non-financial corporations with assets of over
$8 billion, or about 1 1% of the total assets of the 2 0 0
,
largest non-financial corporation s.
These three families also control big financial corpora-.
tions (for example, the Rockefeller family controls the
Chase National Bank) and through such control and by
other devices they exercise &mination over. other corporations which are not mentioned in this study.*
The SEC study, as indicated, confined itself to contr~l
based on stock ownership and to this extent understates
the degree of effective toncentration. .
Another report prepared for the TNEC shows that the
concentration of control of cbrporate wealth is greater
than the concentration of actual ownership in the formal
legal sense. This report cites a study prepared by Gardi'

,

? See Anna Rochester, Rulers
.

lishers.

of Ametico, International Pub-

,n& Means and associates which showed that in igyj, of.
the 250 largest corporations (including the 50 largest
financial ones), 106, owning 60% of combined assets,
coyld definitely be assigned, as far as ultimate control is
concerned, to one of eight corporate interest grouis. T h e
five most important groupings were Morgan-First National; Rockefeller; Kuhn, Loeb; Mellon; and du Pon t .22
Another study of 2 0 0 large corporations . (not exactly,
identical with the- 200- corporations in the SEC ,report)
shws that in 88% of these, accounting for 94% of the
assets, control rested with groups owning less than a
mdjority of the capit!al stock.23 This, of course, do& not
contradict the SEC study which showed that controlling
gr0u.p~usually dominated a substantial or strategically
located minority block of capital stock. ,
CONCENTRATION OF PRODUCTION
Concentration of production is df fundamental irnportance in the development of.monopoly. Even if the concentration is not sb high as tb constitut&monopoly der se,
.*,
xt leads to monopoly. "I-t i s easier to effect collusions,
I , understandings, or agre,ements among a few producers .
: .than m o n g many.
24
,
Thus concentration of production furnishes a foundation far various other types of monopoly control. This
\ #\means
of 'course that simple statistical data on the coqcentration of ,production will understate .the range of
effective ~oncen
tration of control of production.
Most of the TNEC data on concentrati~nof production refer to manufacturing induitries where ap impor' tant index of ddncentration is the size ,of,the individual '
'
manufacturing plant. This indicates the ease or diffi.
culty of entrance of new'capital into the industry.
he average size, of manufacturihg plants has been t
Increasing steadily during the pdst three decades, due
econlargdy to the increasing importance in the national
.
18
.
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omy of l&ge-scale industries, mainly steel, motor vehicles
and parts, electi-ical machinery, and chemicals.
.
,

'

The index of quantity output per manufacturing plant
-increased from roo .in the base year ag 14 to 154 in 1999,
and to 85 in 1937. And the TNEC condudes that . a ,
"marked reduction in the nupbe,r of. smaller establishments and a .moderate increase in the number of larger
. establishments ocCUrced after 1gng." 26
Another important index of kon(=entration'of production in manufacturing iddustries is the growth 'of the
so-called central-office companies. These own two .or
more manufacturing .plants which are cantrolled from - .
a central 'ackniriistrativeoffice. A1though such companies
were only 5~~8%.
of all' 'manufacturing concerns in -1937,. -- they 'employed 5 1 % of all wage earners, paid 55% of the.
' total wage bill; and produced 61% of the. total value of .
all manufactured products.
The increase in concentration is indicated by a corn-, .
parison. (not entirely &kt). of the 1937 . figures above
with those for 1929. In 1929, central-office. fiims emL
- .ploy& 48%< of all wage'eainers and produced 54% of
the value of all .manufactured output.
Another indi&tion of cohcentration of production-is&e
*factthat the 50 largest manufacturing companies owned
on the average 57 plants each, whereas the rest of the
6entral-office companies averaged only four 'blants each.
The 50 largest companies represented less than one-tenth
of-1% of all manufacturing companies in 1937, yet they
produced- 28% of the total value i f all manufactured
products akd'paid ovei. a fifth of' thi,total wages.
k: 1937 s&dy of concentration of the production 'or ,
i ,807 - different manufactured products covered a group
which constituted about one-half .&fthe total number and
value of ~anufacturedproducts given :in chat year's.
cen'sus. For each of these products, the concentration of
prbduction was expressed as a perceniage of the ,total ,

,
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value of .U. S. production supplied by the leading four
manufacturers of that product. This percentage,is called
the "concentration ratio;"
Approximately one-half of the analyzed products hadconcentration ratios above 75%. This means that- for
.one-half of the 1,807 products studied, the leading four
manufacturers of these goods produced 75% or more of
total United states output. Three-quarters of the
analyzed products had concentration ratios of 50% or
more< while more than a fourth (27%) had ratios of
90%The -manufacture of capital. goods was more highly
concentrated - than that of consumers' goods. Thus, about
80% of the products falling into'ihe capital goods categ&y had concentration ratios above 5001,, whereas 66%
of the consumer items were in high concentration
.
brackets.
The manufacture of products
,
whose 'raw materials
cahe from agricultural sources showed lower concentra' tion than1those produced from minerals: 43% of the
former and 69% of the latter had concentration ratios
of 50% or more.
1n Competition and ~ o n q o ibn American KndUstry
(Monograph NO. 2 1) there is a table of 12 I products taken from the'ig37 sample of 1,807 products, whose $slue
. - bf output that year was mofe than $ ~o,ooo,ooo
and whose
- concentration ratio exceeded 75%.
It included various
steel, aluminum, copper, tin, nickel, rubber, rayon, coal
. tar and other chemical products. Others listed were
automobilis, tractors, trucks, aircraft engines, motors,
telephone and telegraph apparatus, power transformers;,
typewriters, adding machines. cash registers, refrigerators,
radios and various glass products. Among the more important basic consumers' goods in the list were sugar,
wool, meat packing and tobaico products, matches, corn-. starch, and*canned meats.

,

I

I
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*

Among the 1,807 products in the sample for 1937 were
$32 in which 5 to lo concerns supplied,the entire output.
1

CONCENTRATION IN STEEL
Steel is an example of a highly concentrated industry.
Ten companies owned 88% of the industry's assets in
1937; four companies owned more, than 66%; two companies owned 55%: The U. S. Steel Corp., with 400/,,
was two and one-half times as large as its closest rival,
~ethlehemSteel .Gorp., and Bethlehem was nearly twice
as large as the third concern, Republic Steel Corp.
Capacity to produce the most important products is
similarly concentrated. For steel ingots, U. S. Steel then
had 35% of productive capacity, Bethlehem 14%~and
Republic 9%. Seven other of the ten leading companies
*eachhad no more than 5%.
U. S. Steel is the giant of the industry. Its manufacturing capachy was greater in 1997 than that of all German produceri combined, more than twice that of the
entire British steel industry, and double that of all the
French mills cornbined.26,
Because of its tremendous size and its high degree of
integration, U. S. Steel is in a position to dominate the
. field. In addition to its facilities for producing pig iron,
steel ingots, and all forms of finished and semi-finished
steel 'products, the corporation,, in 1937, owned and
operated through some 150 subsidiaries, nearly 2,000 oil
and natural gas wells, 89 iron ore mines, yg coal mines,
some 40 limestone, dolomite, cement rock, and clay
quarries, a number of gypsum and fluorspar inines, 2 zinc
mines, a manganese ore mine in Brazil, over 5,000 coking
ovens, several water-supply systems with reservoirs, filtration plants, pumping stations, over loo ocean, lake and
river steamers, 506 barges and tugs, railroads, fire brick
plants, and mills proiiudil?g in,ooo,ooo barrels of cement.
7
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In some industries concentration has .reached,the point
where . one or two c~mphniescontrol' iine-tenth; of the
supply. .A pattial ,list of industries where there is only
one domtnant company is given below.
,.
+
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Industry
Aluminum
~hoe'rna&i&~
, .
_ .
Glass container machinery
Optical,glass
.
1
.
.'

I

.

;Aluminum CS.of.
. America
r

uiniied shw ~ a i . ~ CO.
.r y
Hartford-Empire Co.
B a w h & Lomb Optical Co.

b

.

\

I
.

.

'

I

I

I

Inter~ationalYickel, Co. a£
!p.a-adg

Nickel

2

I

,.

*

8

Molybdenum
Magnesium
Magnesium alloys
Telephone .service
A d c a n Tei. & Tel. Co..
.~nternationalcoinmunications:
Trans-Pacific co&u. .
c commercial Pacific Cable
'
.
1
*
nications
Co. .
Point-fo-point radio teleg- RCA ~drnmunicatiod,
raphy to no'countries
Inc.
American
Tel. & Tel. .Go.
Radistelephony
,
pullman '.cars
Pullman Co.
~rans-oceanicaviation
panoAmericanAirways ' .(~rans-at Ian tic,
- transPacific,Caribbean)
Beryllium
The Beryllium Corp.
I

L
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,CORPOR=4T-EMERGERS
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The merger of independent business upits is a very
important process which speeds up concentration of production. There-have been three great merger movements ip American business history, one in the 'eighties
and early 'nineties, the second at the turn of the ce~tury
and the last one in the post-war*period, igig to 19.29.
The Clayton 'Aliti-Trbt Act of i9a4 has been ineffeccorporate mergers, according to the
tive in,
chief counsel of the Federal Trade Commissiqn. As he
pointed out: I

1

I

64

From 1919 t o 1939, inclusive, g5,ozo corporationshive gone out of industry a n d commerce. This is,at the
average rate of more than 4,5w annually. Many of these
losses have been by merger. . .
"It was clearly through process of merger that pxedominant corporations were built up in tobacco, petroleum,
steel, farm machinery, da'iry products, wheat,
- . flour and
meats among others." 27
-.
'

.

.

,

As to the effect of such concentration, the FTC's repre-sentative testified:

C

.

-*

"The Commission believes that one of the prindary
causes of, the recent depression and of its long duration
was artificial restraint of trade inducing high prices, progressive inability of great dasses of people, to purchaie,
and resulting unemployment. The depression was not
met in many industries, 'as normalIy in times of depreS- .
sibn, by reduction of pri'des but by a concerted effort*to
maintain the high levels so that the usual means *f bringing the mass of buyers baclf on the market .did not becomk operative and unemployment persisted. To this
disastrous process highly organized industries most largely cbntributed and particularly thrqugh the concentra-

,

93
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tion of power in these indusiries resulting from.
mergers." 28
d

THE PATENT MONOPOLY
patents are another important device of monopoly
.
control.
4

.

I

1

-

:'No one can read the testimony developed before this
committee on patents without coming to a realization
that in many important segments of our economy the
privilege accorded by the patent monopoly has been
shamefully abused. It is there revealed in striking
fashion that the privilege given has not been used, as
was intended by the framers of the Constitution and by
the Congress, 'to promote the progress of science and the
useful arts,' but rather for purposes completely at variance with that high ideal. It has been used as a-device
to control whole industries, to suppress competition, to
restrict output, to enhance prices, to suppress inventions,
and to discourage inventiveness." 29

Some of the ways in which patents promote monopoly
are outlined. as follows:
-

"The patentee [i.e., owner of the patent] who licenses
other firms to operate under his patent rights may include in his contract provisions which are designed to
preserve, strengthen, and extend his monopoly. He may
prescribe the quantity that his licensees may produce, the
territories in \which they may sell, the customers with
whom they may .d$al, and the prices which they must
charge, thereby limiting their freedom to compete. He
may insist that they buy exclusively from him, thereby
restricting the market available to his competitors. He
may require them to buy unpatented materials from him,
thereby extending his control into fields where his patent
24

'

s no&apply. His power to refuse or withdraw licenses may thus be employed as a weapon whereby varying degrees of power over the markets for various products may
be acquired." 30
,'
FiKe typical cases, showing the way in which the
patent law operates .to t&e advantage of monopoly,
were cited in Monograph No. g i on Patents- and Free
En
t erprjse 1
Telephones: By 1934 American Telephone & Tele,graph Co. had 9,255 patents of which 1,307 had never
been put to use. Some nine improvements were found
by the Federal ~ommunications- om mission which had
been deliberately withheld by A. T. & T. for from nine
to over 30 years. "The point i s that the public interest
', is not a factor in the judgment to release, defer or suppress" the' patent. The corporation.'^ profit has apparently been the sole criterion, . e
Electric light bulbs: Some %q7 manufacturers of electric
light bulbs are all under mandate of and pay royalties to
General Electric Co. .and Westinghouse Electric & Mfg.
Co. While costs to the two compariies have been sharply
cut, the retail price of bulbs, as a result of price-fixing
- aqangements, has been' reduced only one-third since
1921. Competitors who could cur prices were afraid .to
risk infringement action by General Electric Co. -Although the original Edison patent expired some.45 years
ago, denerd Electric CO.has kept control by patents on
small improvements and on production processes.
Beryllium: -The products of -this ore are of great si&
. nificance in the war program. American production~ras
under Control of an 'international cartel in which Ger-manmonoply played a big part. This cartel had divided
territory, restricted output and fixed prices. The Beryllium Corp. produced this defense material under
licenses of Siemens 8e Halske, giant German trust which
'

/

-
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- permitted no

other b e a k .proddc'ers t~ use
,
their

'

L

patents. . .
. .
Glass contai'ncrs.: ~ h a n k sto- the present patent system,
Hitrtford-Empire Co. licensed and collected royalties .
from firms. accoGnting *for96.601, of the output of, the
glass container industq. And of the three independents
(controlling the r&aining :3.4% .of the output), two
were being sued for infringement of patent at the time
of the investigation.
Automobiles: Here, patent pooling is-practiced among
the big fim.In the );ears . i g ~ p o ~some
j,
547 patents
were pooled. This pocal makes available to &members
inventions which are already commonly used; gut. design patents -md new inventions are withheld, and only
. "improvements" intraduced.
patent monopolies bave seriously interfered 'with,war
production.
The "interchange of .patents-betuieen American and
?foreignconcerns has been used as. a means of cirtelizing
an industryxto effectively displace competition. The
prduction of vitally important materials, such as beryl-.
lium, m a p e s i ~ m optical
,
glass, and chemicals, has beeh
restrained through international patent controlsand
aoss-licensing'which have divided the world markt into
closed areas. As a result, the capacity of American industry>toproduce these materials is not adequate -tomeet
the needs-ofthe defense program." 31
The sa*e* type of restrictive use of patents ,was later
found to exist in the vital synthetic rubber . industry.
They contributed to the critical wartime rpbber shortage.
,
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, CONTROL
,

AND

OF PRICES, PRODUCTION

SALES

b i d e r the system of free enterprise, or, more correctly,
the system of private capitalism, prices. are supposed to26

.

act as a sort of regulator and st'abilizer -of industry.
Capitalist economic theory hoMs that the possibiiity of .
rapid adjustment of economic relationships which exists
under a system of flexible and competitive' market prices
at least partly compensates for the, lack of over-a0
eco,
nomic planning.
This "system of free enterprise can exist," says the
TNEC, "only if industrial markets are free from manipulations and controls of private groups. Then alone can
prices freely perform their function as the regulator and
stabilizer of industry. But abundant evidence exists to
show that in a vast range of commodities prices, far from
being objectively determined in the market [i.e., determined by the free play of competitive force's-~d.], -are
influenced, administered, ,or managed by persons of
power, so that price competition has
industrial fields." 32
"Unlike such products as wheat, over whose price no
individual buyer or seller can' exert any appreciable influence, the prices of such comaodities as &eel, aluminum, automobiles, cigarettes, and bread are all subject ta
a substantial degree of control by a limited number'of
executives in.a few large companies."

\

)

/

s-

-

The object of price control or price stabilization by the
large corporations is to increase 'or stabilize their profits.
Within the scope of their economic control they attempt
to carfy out plans to achieve such an end. This plarining
is, of course, quite different from over-all social planning
for the welfare of all. It is an bnco-ordinated private
planning of separate, though largei corporate gioups,
. each with a view to its own profits. Its main result is to
rob the capitalist . system of the degree of adjustability
that exists under free competitive price conditions.
Monopoly "obstructs adjustment to economic change
27

.

and thus contribute; to general induikial instability. . .
The necessary adjustments, when they occur, are violent
instead of gradual. By stabilizing price, the rno&opolist
.unstabilizes the whole economy." 34
s

Managed prices permit the monopolized sector of the
economy to exploit the competitive sector, the latter comprised mainly of small -business and agriculture. This
process, moreover, results in increasing unemployment:

' "In

the competitive kctor of the economy prices are
fleGble; in the monqpolized sector they are rigid. In the
former area, price is:cut to maintain output when demand declines. In theratter, outpdt is cut to maintain
price. By refusing to sell at figures which would move
- his g&ds, the monopbIist leaves factories idle and labor
.unemployed.. ~ o n s u m e rincome falls and, with it, the
demand for products of competitive industries. The
prices of these prducts are further depressed. Their
producers can no longer buy the goods whose prices are
maintained." 85
-.*:.yi
* .:
President- ~odse;elt'e q q s a g e af April ng, igg8, referreh to the effect of man,aged:price ori employment inthe following word;: 8
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'Wanaged industrial-prices mean tewer jobs. I t is no
add&at.that in' industriei -like cement and sreel where
@ees.@wz zeniained firm in' the face of a falling d e m b d
pay r011d'hav shrunk as much as 40% and 50% in recent
months. Nar is ;it merexhance that in most competitive
induskies where prices adjust themselves quickly -to falling demand;- pay rolls and employment have been far
better maintained. By pGces we mean, of course, the
prices' of the :finished articles and not the wages paid to
.
workers."
,

,
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he devices of

.

private. or managed price' control are
i

varied.
"Where one or' a few firms dominate a trade, price
leadership is likely to obtain. If a single firm overtops
its rivals, it may invariably take the initiative in raising
or lowehng the price. If two or more concerns are dom:
inant, one may habitually serve as leader oe more than
one may lead, each in a different territory or each, in
turn. The smaller firms in such a field will follow the
' changes that itre announced and sell at the prices that
are set. , They may be subjected to hidden pressure by
the leader. They may fear annihilation in the warfare
that would be-provokedby an attempt to undercut him.
They may seek to ob'tain larger profits by tiking refuge
under the price umbrella which he holds over the trade.
They may merely find it convenient to follow his lead.
In any case, they . abandon independence of judgment
and adopt his prices as their own."36

,

.

'
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Evidence of such "price leadership" was found, for
example, in the sale of steel, cement, agkicultural imple:
ments, gasoline, ' non-f errous metals, newsprint paper,
glass containers, and cxvde petroleum. .
Another type of private price control occors whqe
coinpetitors enter,into agreements establishing and maintaining uniform prices. Such agreements afk likely to
-exist in markets where a few producers control most of
the shpply. - They are plainly violations of the anti-trust
- laws, yet thk Federal Trade o om mission has uncovered
many such agreements. Among the industries recently
charged with such practices were rayon, tin plate, turbine
generators and condensers, liquid chlorine, calcium.
chloride, fertilizer, metal lath, gasoline, newsprint, to, bacco products, and typewriters. In addition, indications
of price agreements have been found in the steel, irpn
ore, chemical, nitrogen, and potash industries.
.*9
,

H

+
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In industries producing heavy products the cost of
transportation of the product from factory to buyer is
an important part of the delivered price or cost to the
buyer. Where monopoly elements in such an industry
a+e strong enough to- bring about, by means of.price
leadership or price agreement, a System of uniform prices
at the 'producing factories, it is quite likely that such
uniformity will be reinforced by a system of uniform
charges for freight'.
T o achieve "delivered price" uniformity the companies calculate freight costs from a common basing
point regardless of the a c t d location of the producing
plant. Thus under the old "Pittsburgh Plus" system in
the steel industry, buyers paid the cost at the producing
factory plus transportation costs from Pittsburgh, the
basing point. The delivered price to a buyer in Chicago
was consequently the same whether the producing plant
was 'located in Pittsburgh, Chicago
or Birmingham.
.
I

I

CARTELS AN-D TRADE ASSOCIATIONS
One qf the most .important factors in the growth of
monopoly since the First World War has been the de.velopment -of cartels and cartel-like organizations such
as trade associations.
A cartel is Fn association based on an agreement
between. corporations for the purpose -of exerting a
r n ~ n ~ ~ o l i .sinfluence
tic
- on the market. Through such
organizations monopolistic contrql may be e~tendedeven
into fields where there are, numerous producersc However,. the strongest cartel-like arrangements exist in industries where the number, of companies is relatively
small.
.,
Dr. Theodore J. Kreps, T ~ E economic
C
adviser, said
' of the development of cartels:
'

. {

%

,

/

"They bob up especially #inthose lines of enterprise

30

I

I

which require advanced macnlne technology and heavy
tipvestment in plant and equipment. They crop up1
wherever patents or market outlets or mineral'deposits
are cQnkentrated in few hands." 37
,

+

Concentration of production lays the groundwork for
- the 'formation of cartels. Of the conditions hece~sai.~
f6r
the formation of cartels,. Dr. Kreps saki:
,

!

,

if products are standard articles of
"It..helps,
mass consumption, if productive processes are highly
mechanized; if the sources of supply whether of taw materials, laibor, or patents are few, and if the minimum
and optimum size of plants is large. . :Cartels really
don't operate effectively until, due to 'various techpical
sit,uations, control has been concentrated in a few hands, '
where decisions need to be .made by relatively few people
to have an important influence on the 'market." , 98

.

,-

Cartels, oil& formed; iead to still greater concentration.
I

-.

,"Under certain . cofiditions," Kreps concluded, "they
may become the-rcaffolding for man&polistic structures.
and gigantic business combines $hi& begin by dictating
trade practices, ,prices, production, and sales and culminate if unchecked in dictatorial corporate*statism" .
[i.e., domination of the government by business corpora-'
tions-Ed.] .a9
*

I

?
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The simplest and supetficially the - m*&t innocuous
type of cartel is,the so-called ''term" cartel 'in which the.
members agree to regulate + sales terms. For example,
they may, have uniform conditions of delivery with regard'
t~ terms of payment, discounts and the l?kke. .Such agreements are comrpon,in the United States, in the form of
trade ptactice conference codes
. . sponsored by various
trade associations.
.
More important is the price-fixing cartel which +regugi
.
I
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lates sales prices, eithir by open price lists or by uniform
cost accounting systems.
the cost elements, such as
the price of raw materials, wages, the allocation for overhead and the gross profit margin' &e uniform. Such
agreements are illegal in this country, but American
ttade associations provide the vehicle through which
corporations achieve results equivalent to those of open
price-fixing cartels. .
More advanced types of cartels regulate output or
divide up. sales, territories or customers among various
companies. Such quota cartels have operated here
among building materials dealers, and in the copper,
cottan yarn, textile, oil refihing, elevator manufkcturing,
window glass, anthracite coal, meat packing, glass container, incandescent lamp, and other industries.

ere

TRADE ASSOCIATION PRACTICES
In 1940 there were about 2,000 national trade assocf
ations in the U. S. Many of these ' are weak organizations operating in industries where there are a large
number' of producers. As indicated above, cartel-like
organizations tend to be most effective in industries
where there are a few big corporate units.
,

"The national associations of steel companies, manufacturers, bankers, *ailroads and electri; utilities are
largely dominated by big corporations and thus consti:
tute an extension of their irifluence." 40
A study of 1,244 national and regional trade associations showed that over half of them (53.9%) engaged
in activities described as "combating unfair competition." Over 977; of them were engaged in so-called
industry cost studies.41 These cost studies are a disguised method of bringing about uniform prices. Dr.
Clair Wilcox described to a TNEC hearing the way this
*
works:

,

"Trade a s e a t i o n s go on to standardization of methods of calculating costs, establishing the prices at which
raw materials we to be included, or the treatment of
overhead. The next step is the standardization of the
amount- of profit induded in costs. - As Burns * says, the
resulting figure then becomes a desired selling price."*Z

.

Trade associations apply pressure to individual sellers
to force them to adhere to the recommended common
-cost figures by various means-for example, by recommendations in their publications, by resolutions passed
at meetings, or persuasion by, association officials.
'
An important problem *ofthe trade association is keeping clear of the Federal anti-trust laws. The first big ,
growth bf trade associations came after igio when the
Supreme Court weakened the anti-trust laws, by itS
enunciation of the so-called rule of reason in the Stand-.
ard Oil case. Trade associations had their greatest
growth during the period of the First' World-War and
during the life of &&National Industrial Recovery Act,
both being periods in which the enforcement of the antitrust laws was relaxed.
In spike of lax enforcement by the Department.of
Justice there have been numerous cases in which trade
associations have run afoul of the anti-trust liws. For
example, there are.."-no6 associations which have been
named as defendants in anti-trust proceedi~gsby the
Department of Justice. Many of these assodations have
been defendants in one or more cases since March 24,
1938.' It is probable that this list does not exhaust the
instances in which unlawful restraints of trade-have d&
veloped among trade associations. The personnel of the '
Anti-Trust Division has been, insufficient to investigate
and prosecute all' substantial complaints which have
come to its attention. Theke is reason to believe that a
* Prof. Arthur Robert' Bums, author o f Decline of Competition.
33 -
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oader program of investigation would have resulted
in .cases against addiiional associations.'"-48

In addition there have been several hundred cases in
which the Federal Trade Commission has banded down
"cease and desist" orders concerning activities of trade

associations.
The National Industrial ~ecoveryAct (NIRA) introduced compulsory cartelization in the U. S. 'through the
industry codes provided for 'in the 'Act. Trade associations played an important ,part in the ini'tiatip' and
administration of these codes. Under some codes, the
trade association itself was the code authority; in others,
i t selected the code authority or a majority thereof. In
general, trade' association and c ~ d eauthority officers and
executiviis were.the same. A special study of the U. S.. . '
'Departmept of Commerce revealed that in about 600
out of 850 codes, the secretary of the code authority and
[the chief executive of ,the tta& &sociation had the
same name and did business at the same address.44
The TNEC investigation revea!ed that the later
opposition ~f businew interests to the .National Recovery
Administration was not a reflection of their opinion
of the cartel .features of the codes. As Dr. ~ r e ex~ s
plained:
"I do not doubt that the emergence on the NRA
<
- Board of a majority genuinely interested i
n the welfare
of consumers and laborers may'have been conducive to
the lack of interest on the part 'of business in the 'NRA
device. ~usinessdid not like the wage-hour provisions
and in particular resented section 7A which provided for
coll'ective 'bargaining. As the ,quotation from the pamphlet issued by the United States Chamber of Commerce
shows, business liked the cartel features of NRA, the production and
&ntrols. The. NRA was a quid
pro quo. The Government gave business the right to .
34
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combine if business would meet certain wage-hour, requirements. Business then liked and still desires to get
together in production, sales and prices. What business
did not like was the non-cartel features of NRA." (Our
emphasis;-Ed.) 45 .

CHANGING
FORMS OF MONOPOLY
* !
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One of the main achievements of the Congressional
s its
Pujo investigation of the money trust in i g i ~ - i was
exposure of the high degree of control exercised by 'financial and banking institutions over railroads, public utilities, insurance companies and major industries.
This committee' showed that a cardinal feature of
modern monopoli was the integration of big finance and .
,big industry. The American economic system could no
longer be accuiately desdribed as a system of industrial
capitalism; it had become a system of monopoly capitaIisrn.46
The TNEC produced no -evidence of any weakening
in the integratibn of the financia1 and industrial .sides of
big business. On the contrary, it showed that the resources of finance-investment and commercial banking
and the security exchanges-were largely barred to
smaller business and were largely a monopoly of big
business.
It substantiated also the findings of Anna Rochester
in her basic study of finance capital in the United States,
Rulers- of America, ' prepared u d e r the direction of '
Labor Research Association.
Nevertheless, the TNEC indicated that financial institutions have not been playing the same dynamic role in
the oeanization and extension of monopoly that they
had played in the period preceding the First World War.
The growth of monopoly, since that war was attributed
to the "lax enforcement of' the anti-trust laws, the im1

,

'

petus'of price-fixing given by World War I, the tremendous development of trade associations during the 'twenties which increased price-fixing,
the NRA experiment
t
in 1933, and the great merger movements.
a' 47
- The TNEC placed particular emphasis on the process
of cartelization, which, as-noted above, is the organizing
of entire industries for the purpose of curtailing or eliminating competition through price-fixing, output limitation and other means.
- One of the most significant features of the price-fixing
activities of cartels and trade associations is that they
seek to maintain prices at a "level that will keep even
the highest cost firms in existence and give to a e others
abnormally high returns." 48
Thus modern monbpoly seeks, as one ikp*rtant obj,ective, to stabilize or freeze the existing s e w , to eliminate
the dynamic factors in a capitalist economy. This objective was observed to exist in other connections-in the
- well-known tendency of modern monopoly, for example,
to restrict technological progress. This was not so characteristic of the earlier or more progressive p&iod of
capitalist development.

. ..
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~ E C L I N EOF BANK CREDIT
The weakening rqle of banking as a dynamic factor.
in the economy is demonstrated by a number of important facts, one of which appears in the field of commercial banking. The growing financial self-sufficiency of
large business enterpfises in. the United States has ren'dered them to a large degree'independent of bank credit.
Thus, while +in1921 commercial loans constituted 52%
of the loans of ~ e d e r a Reserve
l
member, banks, .by 1938
these had fallen to 23%.*9 The greater -part of the investments of commercial banks is now in government
securities, longrterui corporate . bonds, real estate 'and
loans. .
36

Commercial banks are thus becoming largely disconnected from the financing of productive industry and are
turning more 'and more into saving institutions investing
in government bonds and "non-productive", loans. 1n
this respect they are closely approaching the character
of life-insurance companies and ordinary savings banks.

GROWTH OF "NON-PRODUCTIVE" WEALTH
The low rate of use of national savings for productive
purposes, which is referred to below, has resulted in a
great increase in so-called "non-productive',' wealth.
U. S. Government bonds, for example, increased over $32
billion in the ten-year period ending June 30, 1940. The
concentration of ownership of "non-productive" wealth,
however, appears to be somewhat lower than the concentration of ownership of productive industrial wealth
as indicated by. the concentration of stqck ownership in
non-financial corporations. .
The ownership of tax-exempt government bonds, in
so far as these are held by individuals, is highly concentrated. Thus, in 1937, some 55,000 persons owned 62%
of all such bonds owned by individhals with net incomes
over $5,000.60
However, a substantial fraction of the natien's "nonproductive" wealth (government bonds, real estate
securities and the like) is nominally owned by savings
institutions (life insurance companies, savings and commercial banks, pension funds and similar agencies). A
fair share of the obligations of ,some of these institutions
is owned by the middle income groups. It is therefore
to be expected that concentration of all forms of wealth
combined is less than that of ownership of capital stock:
Unfortunately data on the\ concentration of wealth as a
whole are lacking,.but a few studies of concentration of
current savings out of income are available.
Since income saved arises largely from the profits of
37
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accumulated wealth it is likely that the concentration
ratios for - current saving and -accumulated wealth are
similar. A .study of savings. in 1935-36 showed that
nehly 40% of current savings came from somk 110,ooo
families and single individuals, or only 0.3% 'of the
population.61 It appears that, tltough the concentration
of savings is very high, it, as well as the concentration of
"non-productive" wealthyis nevertheless somewhat lower
than hie ctjncentratioq of oynership of
productive industrial wealth. The latter remains one of. the most
striking evidences o f ' the monopoly character of the
American economy.
,
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DECLINE OF CAPITAL MARKETS
An important indication of the 'declining function of
financial institutions as a dynamic factor in the capitalist economy is the fact that practically all the expenditures of American industry for plant and equipment
in recept years have come from the internal sources -of
the powerful corporations and not from borrowing in
the cqpital markets. Thus a study of 58 large industria1
comp'ames, with aggregate assets of $12 b i l h n in 1938,
showed that' in the ten years 1930-39, about goyo of an
outlay of . $5.6 billion for plant, equipment and other
investments camefrom internal sources, that is, from
undistributed
profits, reserves for depreciation and the
like.62
In contrast, the traditional capital market (stock and
, bond issues and bank loans) provided only 10%
of-this
outlay of' $5.6 billion. In fact, taking all of American
business enterprises in the aggregate, in no year between
1922 and 1940 had the amount of productive capital
obtained'through the regular capital markets touched the
$2 billion mark.
While .most of the funds invested in expansion of plant
and equipment came from the direct savings of the
a

I

'

'
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wealthy corporations themselves, such . savings were
usually under two-fifths of the total annual savings of
the national economy.53 ~ h ; erest of the savings were,
for the most part, those of wealthy individuals out .of
personal incomes deriveg from dividends, interest, rents,
managerial salaries, and profits.
When the industrial system is expanding, it 'draws
aeavily on the savings of these wealthy individuals, and
the various institutions comprising the capital market
constitute the necessary medium through which the
draft of savings is accomplished. The declinipg impor
- tance of the capital markets, therefore, reflects stagnation
in the national economy itself.

.

ECONOMIC STAGNATION
'The failure, during the decade 1980-39, of the industrial system to expand at a rate requiring the reinvestment of the major part of available savingq is a result
of the concentration of wealth in fewer and fewer hands.
"Concentration of income and wealth," says the TNEC,
, "is the most important single factor leading to a volume
of capital expenditures inadequate for the mainte~ance
.and expansion of the national income." This is due to
the fact that "savings are made by individuals and,groups
who do not or will not themselves consume the output
of the capital goods.which their savings can create."s*
As ''~a~ital'expenditures
will not be made unless the
output of existing facilities can be sold," the purchasing
power of the people of the country must be adequate
to buy back the increasing output. However, as the
TNEC notes, "the increase in output of existing and
new productive plant seems 'to outstrip the increase in .
consumer purchasing power. . . ." 55 As a consequence
industrial expansion comes to a halt and crisis and depression take-its place with their plague of idle men, idle .
machines and idle money.'
,

All the, pha~esof economic smgnation noted abvethe changed role of financial institutions, the small pop
. , tion of available capital ciupply.used for productive purposes, the growing proportion of "non-productive" ..wealth
and the unemplopent' of A n , machines, and money@e related to-the development of monopoly in the 'national economy.
It is clear that economic stagnation (hreatens the main' - tenance of the high level of profits which certain
' monopoly groups have so actively promoted,
It ispot
, surprising, thereforef that these groups have reacted
vigorou'sly to this threat, developing new land more
.
securing and extending their
aggressive methods of
profitable exploitation.
Economic eras cannot be s k d up in phrases but if
one attempted to characterize the era studied by the Pujo
iqvestigation, roughly the 25 years before the ~ i r &
World
War,it could be said that it was an era of active formation of 'monopoly,.of creation of an immense pool of
super-profitwhich monopoly sipho.ned off.
The ex% &died 'by the TNEC .inveitigation, rohghly
the 25 years preceding the present 'war,was one in which
s
m&opoly ~ u g h to
t stabilize its set-up, to -fight off decay
and collapse, and to develop new and more aggressive
methods to extend and secure itself. These methods, in.
so 'far as the economic sphere is concekned, aie best expressed in the ~Gtelizationof industry.
I
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GERM-~N
AN<D-AMERICAN'CARTELS Germany has always been1 the. classic land .of cartek.,
But. even ;here, where cartels were known long before
the First worldWar,,the main growth occurred during
and after that war, the process reaching its 'culmination
in the compulsory cartelization introduced by the Nazi
'

'

-

state.
,
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Similarities between Germany and thi U. S. we& noted

*

'

in the TNEC investigation. Thusyone expert, Dr. Herbert von 'Bekerath, declared in his book, Modern Inddstrial Organization, that: "the number. (and importance)
of cartelb and similar organizations in Germany is at least
three times as large as it was before the [first World] war.
The situation is similar .in most other industrial countries, including the United States, where export cartels
have been legalized, and an iricreGing number of cartel- ,
like organizations are developing in the domestic market.
They are being developed successfully in forms which
avoid publicity and prosecution by the
boards enforcing the anti-trust,laws, and they try to keep
their activities within such limits as the government is
able or willing .to permit." 56 .
The cartel-like organization referred to here is the
American trade associati'on'.whose price-fixing and other
activities we have discussed above;
Rudolf Calllhann, an international authority on car,
tels, commenting on the similarity between the United
States and Germany, observed:

"In my judgment it is no mere coincidence that the
*world depression was greatest, and sukequent recovery
slowest, in precisely those two industrialized nations of
. modern times, the united' states and Germany,- where
efforts at 'rationalization or stabilization' by business- respective govmen had been most encouraged by their
I
ernments. . . ~ 7 .
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"SELF-GOVERNMENT I N INDUSTRY"
.
So-called rationalization and iabilization of ifidustry
though cartel methods have been most actively advanced
in the United States under the innocuous-sounding name .
of "self-goGernment In industry," On this point Call-.
mann declared: ."The car&elmoveaent and ~elf~government of industry are to a large
extent identical." 68 In
.
.
1
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the United States the self-government in industry movement has been fostered largely by the trade associations.
The logical outcome of this movement was revealed to be
the "'collec~ivedetermination of prices, the curtailment of
output, the allocation of harkits and production, and
the enforcement of these arrangements by the imposition
of [penalties; in short, the complete cartelization of
American business." 59
The objective of "self-government in industry" is expcessed'by its defenders in such terms as "elimination df
kt-throa; competition," "adjustment df production to
consumption," "planned economy of business."
The difference between the big-business planning contemplated by the cartel or self-government-in-industry
movement and genuine economic planning for the social
welfare was explained.by Dr. Isador Lubin, U. S. Commissioner of Labor Statistics, as follows:

I

-

"I think your national and your international cartel
is economic planning for a particular purpose, namely,
the welfare of the people who control the cartel, as opposed to a type of planning which may have as its enb '
lower prices, greater distribution of goods, the higher
standard of living for' the nation as a whole, and I can see
where that type of 'planning would conflict definitely
with the type of planning that goes with a national or
international cartel where you are not concerned with
your consumer at all, your consumer of the maximum'.
possible under the conditions under which .you operate." a

@
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Dr. Lionel Rabbins put i t somewhat differently in his
volume, The Great Depression, cited in the hearings: .
I

,

"The problem df planning is not to be solved by giving
each industry the power of self-government (i.e., restric...
tion of entrv and production). This is not
42
.
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It merelv extends to whole industries the right to make
plans fo; themselves similar to the right already enjoyed
by individual entrepreneurs. But by eliminating competition, or potential competition, it ' creates a .state of
affairs much less likely to be stable-much more likely t,o
be restrictive-than the &called chaos of competitive
,
enterprise."
POLITICAL PRESSURES
~ h TNEC
;
noted that in its cartelized form, big 'business was capable of exerting terrific political pressure on
, the various organs of government. '1n fact "government
relations" 6r, more cbrrectly, high-pressure lobbying, is
one of the main-.functionsof trade 'associations and similar organizations.. In a study of the political pressure
exerted by business it was etated that by "business" was
meant the "business community, as dominated by the
200 largest non-financial Bnd the 50 largest financial corporations, and the employer and trade associations into
which it and' its satellites are organized." (Our emphasis.
-Ed.) 62
This study of political pressures named among the foremost big business pressure instruments such organizations
as the Chamber of Commerce of the U. S., the National
Association of Manufacturers, the Edison Electric Institute, the American Bankers Association and the Asspciation of Life Insurance Presidents.63
So powerful have these big business associations become that they are sometimes referred to as the "Third
House of Congress." According to the National Lumber
Manufacturers" Association', . "The reriresentation of a
territorial area or of 9 certain part of the population'
often counts for less in point of influence than the industrial representation marshalled in a given cause."" This
employer trade association contends that "industrial repi
resentation" is inevitable. 'd

/
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'Industrial representation," as understood byemployersY
associations, does not, of course, include any independent
' labor representation.
It suggests, rather, the system
of "corporations," "chambers" or "syndicates" which is
,the main underlying support of all fascist dictatorships.
Although "ind~utria.1representation" stops short of f ascism, which openly' places government power in the
hands of big business bodies, it would cleakly undermine
the effectiveness of the democratic system and the politi- cal power of workers, farmers and small businessmen.
The Germah exflrience is instructive. As Rudolf
. Callmann -testified with reference to the political influ- ence of big business before the advent of the Nazi dictatorship: '
'

-

,

''in German> where there were also many goverw
miental boar&, commissions9- and lobbies, the heads or
representatives of the great corporations, cartels, trade.,assoc$tions, chambers of commerce, and industry exerd
cised'important, and in manjy cases:domiriant, ' influence.
Eventually, Jnd orie knew wha'had whom on the leash:
the industry the Goverpment or- the Government the
,
industry."
'.
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T& question
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which pu~zled' this ~xp&t.-&h* had !
, *kibi&i,
on the leash-yiw
clarified jh the operationii..
of the W&i state. German b;ig business, having nour,

a

'

igh& the N&i. :movemht
,
to gnaiyrc'ity,turned the .state- ,
.- power ovt$ to its gangster cohortti. - The latter qui&ly
moved inti5 the ranks ,of the big caiit~listswho instiq-n
' n&fess quibH~'d~nhd'the
ganpter uniform. TIE unity ;
- of big,busihess
, . \ . and the &im.inal zindq-ld
in the, N y i
: . -..st'kte'wa~
the: final outcome of .the btg business drivk for .
cumP1ete domination the.nqtionk eqonomi&life. ,
. . h.
&tide in "Fareign ~omme*ce
, , .
'weekly," June 80,
a 942, says, that an odftsfand.ingeconomic result .of, the
-

.
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Nazi regime "has been a sharp accelerqtion in the trend
toward emnomic concentration:"

WARTXME DEVELOPMENTS

(

1

Based as-it has been on the TNEC investigation, which
w e largely completed before the initiation of the war-.
time economy in the W&ted S ~ t e s ,this booklet has
necessarily taken little account of wartime developments.
It is clear that to date the war production prokam hiis
enormously hastened the process of economic concentra- .
tion which is the heart of m6nopoly. This has resulted
from the concentration of war contracts in large firms,
from the necessary expansion of heavy industry at the
expense of &e co&umers' goods iadustry, and from the
general economic itislocation of wartime which tends to
uvdermine small bpsiness with its weak reserves.
Although the latest figures on concentration of war
contracts aie not available, the War Production Board
reported ,in Mayy q42: that I& l&e companies then
held 76% .of all war supplies contra& of $~jo,oooor
more. .At the same time there were still at least I o$poo
manufacturing establishments in the country not being
used for wafproduction i6 any way. ,
As shown in the reports of the Truman Committee
of &e U. S. Senate, investigating the progress of national defense, the war agencies and bureaus have been
largely dominated by dollar-a-year men. Many of these
men tend to divert the war program in the intereit of
their own corporate profits, both now and in the postwar period. They have hindered the efforts of those who
have tried to show that war needs come first, and not consolidation of the monopoly position' of any coiporation.
If these big corporation groups 'were to mttintain their
hold on the War Production Board and the supply
boards of the armed services, the hand of monopoly
would undoubtedIy be strengthened. But fordunatelj
+
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there are united forces of labor, progressives and others
who have'been seeking to prevent 'this reactionary disruption of the war program.
Labor, the co-untry's most powerful democratic force,
is not only backing the gjovernment ~ O inQ the~ war.
~
Through labor-management committees and through
gowing representat ion on various government bodies
it is making its voice increasingly heard in an Admin- istration which enjoys broad popular support. This participation of labor is a fundamental requirement in a
people's war-for naAona.1 survival. '1t is a guarantee that
the defeatists - and appeasers, fifth columnists and other
fascist-minded persons in the United States will not be
successful in their drive to destroy national unity.
Monopoly, as we have seen, always shows a fascist,
antidemocratic trend both in its foreign and domestic
policies and rela$ionships. It tends to play with foreign
interests of a like nature. Specifically, we have seen how
the big corporate ihterests here have been linked with
Nazi influence in many industries: aluminum, synthetic
rubber, magnesium, tungsten-carbide, drugs, dyestuffs,
and a variety of other critical war rnaterials.66
But the people's forces, if properly organized, can
effectively counter the defeatist plans of these big business interests. Democratic forces can be. mobilized- to
attack the fascist forces both on the foreign front and on
the home front, to expose the maneuvers of any corporate
interests which may be open or disguised friends of
fascism.
Unity of all the people in the struggle against the
worst tyranny in history is the present next step in the
fight for a democratic world. The enemies of democracy,
including the monopolists who would betray America,
.are doomed to defeat through the victory of the United
Nations over. t$e Axis.

,
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